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Abstract
Research regarding public perceptions of the legitimacy and reasonableness of protest
groups, as well as support for these groups and identification with their causes have been studied
extensively. However, much is still to be investigated on perceptions of protest groups by way of
public attitudes toward protest violence, likelihood of engagement in activism, and political
alignment with conservative or liberal ideologies. This study aimed to assess perceptions and
attitudes toward conservative and liberal protest groups’ use of violent and nonviolent behavior.
Participants read a description of one of four protest groups, with each group varying by political
affiliation (conservative or liberal) and use of violence (violent or nonviolent). Participants then
completed measures of public solidarity with the protest group as well as favorability ratings and
attitudes toward the group. Participants also completed measures assessing their beliefs about
violence, their capacity for future activist engagement, and their political alignment with
conservative and liberal values. Results indicated that violent protesting behavior elicited a
higher rating for participant intentions for future activism, on average, as compared to nonviolent
protesting behaviors. Additionally, those reading about liberal protest groups expressed higher
levels of solidarity and more favorable attitudes toward protest groups, on average, than did
those reading about conservative protest groups. Further research in the evaluation of support for
and attitudes toward protest groups is critical to expanding knowledge on protest group and
protest observer dynamics. In addition, exploration of personal views on violence, intentions to
protest, and political identity will continue building understanding around public perceptions
related to support for protest groups and their causes.

Keywords: protest, public perception, violence, political affiliation
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Perceptions of Conservative and Liberal Protest Groups’ Use of Violent and Nonviolent
Behavior
A notable feature of American democracy is the ability to debate and express differences,
particularly in political values and beliefs. This is a central tenet in understanding the ideological
and sociopolitical contexts of American democracy. To understand public perceptions of
protesting, Ralph Turner aptly defined social protest as action that is marked by a “feeling of
grievance” and that has the “intent to provoke ameliorative action” (1969, p. 816). Turner (1969)
contextualized the underlying principle as to why people engage in protesting, offering that due
to their sentiments of grievance, people are led to seek absolute justice and take decided action
for these transgressions. To effect ideological and political change in the United States, social
protest movements have been at the forefront of these causes, having implications on public
perceptions of protesting and general attitudes toward protesting (Gillion, 2020). Research on
protest movements, also known as collective action, has primarily focused on protesting as a
means of effecting social change through various tactics and strategies to address social
inequities (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). In their paper on the social and psychological dynamics
of collective action, van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) note the implications that contextual factors,
populations, and measures have in studying these dynamics of protesting, including normative
and non-normative (i.e., nonviolent and violent) sociopolitical resistance as one such area of
focus.
One of the most prominent examples of sociopolitical resistance in American history took
place during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 60s. Remembered as a distinct time of
protest and activist engagement against racial and other human rights-related injustices, both
violent and nonviolent forms of resistance ensued. Although these two forms of protesting and
1

activism differed in their operation, the American government regarded both forms as
contentious behavior (Tarrow, 2011).
Recent psychological research, however, has determined that violent protesting
behaviors, in particular, tend to result in diminished support from the public (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011). Further research has explored the efficacy and effectiveness of violent as
opposed to nonviolent forms of social protests, which have concluded that the usefulness of these
approaches in collective action tend to depend on their ability to gain support from the public
(Feinberg et al., 2020; Muñoz & Anduiza, 2019; Tarrow, 2011; Thomas & Louis, 2014; Wang &
Piazza, 2016). Results from these studies posit that public support for protest groups is
influenced by use of violent protesting strategies such that the use of violence during protest
weakens public support for protest groups (Muñoz & Anduiza, 2019; Thomas & Louis, 2014;
Wang & Piazza, 2016), even viewing groups as immoral in their actions when using violence
during protest (Feinberg et al., 2020).
Interestingly, regarding the use of violence or nonviolence in protesting, Feinberg et al.
(2020) argue that to influence change at the institutional level or to raise awareness about a social
movement, defiant and harmful forms of protesting behavior (e.g., damaging property and
engaging in physical violence) are effective strategies, but limit support from the public. Their
findings suggest that when groups partake in these extreme protesting behaviors, diminished
support from the public occurs, thus creating an “activist’s dilemma” (Feinberg et al., 2020).
Groups engaging in collective action are met with a predicament in either focusing on effecting
governmental change or gaining support from the public, depending on their use of protest
violence.
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Based on a study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2018), 74% of Americans
agreed that it is very important for the country that “people are free to peacefully protest” (p. 27).
It is imperative to note here that there is a critical distinction made, emphasizing the need for
protests to be peaceful for them to be an accepted form of collective action by the public. This
supports Feinberg and colleagues’ findings that public perceptions and support for a protest
movement rely on peaceful and nonviolent forms of protesting actions. The Pew study also
investigated partisan differences of the importance on the right to peacefully protest. Results of
the study indicated that 82% of surveyed Democrats thought that it was very important for the
country that “people are free to peacefully protest,” while only 64% of Republicans agreed to
this statement. In this regard, collective action groups are subject to these differences in partisan
attitudes, and likely so, based on their use of protest violence or nonviolence.
Political Solidarity as a Theory
Political solidarity, or the notion of aligning with outgroup members in their pursuit of
equality per the outgroup’s cause, is dependent on three factors: allyship to the outgroup,
connectedness to the outgroup, and a commitment to social reform for the outgroup (Neufeld et
al., 2019). Scholz theorizes political solidarity as being taken on as a response to a “particular
injustice, oppression, social vulnerability, or tyranny” to an outgroup (2008, p. 51). Political
solidarity calls individuals to “scrutinize [their] personal [lives] for [the cause’s] political
impact” (Scholz, 2008, p. 53). Thus, political solidarity is rooted in sacrificing some aspect of
oneself for the benefit of others. Neufeld and colleagues (2019) forward the developing theory of
political solidarity based on these three factors, noting that there is an inherent relational aspect
to engaging in political solidarity, bound by a sense of togetherness. Evaluation of allyship,
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connectedness to a cause, and social change commitment in relation to political solidarity, each
rely on public perception of outgroup behavior (Neufeld et al., 2019).
A question then is raised as to how destructive and violent behavior during protesting
may impede support for protest groups or general perceptions about these groups. Scholz
proposes that use of violence is in fact, “inconsistent with political solidarity,” in that
consideration for the relationships between the solidarity group and the outgroup are critical to
success in achieving the outgroup’s goals, which may be disjointed by use of violence (Scholz,
2007, p. 47). Other attitudes about protest groups and perceptions of these groups may also be
impacted by use of protest violence in addition to feelings of allyship, connection, and social
change commitment seen in political solidarity.
Attitudes Toward Violence
In a study on perceptions of violent and nonviolent protesting behavior, researchers
explored how exposure to differences in use of violence of protest groups (i.e., an antiracist
protest group and a white nationalist protest group) affected the perceived reasonableness of
protesters and support and identification with said protest group (Simpson et al., 2018).
Researchers found that there was less support for a violent antiracist protest group when
compared to a violent white nationalist protest group and that participants tended to identify with
the antiracist group less while also viewing them as less reasonable. When the antiracist group
demonstrated violence, this led to an increase, on average, in participant support for the white
nationalist protest group, as compared to the antiracist group. However, support did not decrease
for white nationalist members who displayed violence as compared to a decrease in support for
violent antiracist members. Simpson et al. (2018) postulated that this may be due to a floor effect
– that is, because there already tends to be low levels of identification with white nationalist
4

groups and they are viewed as unreasonable, this group likely already receives the least amount
of support possible.
In a more recent study, researchers explicitly measured attitudes toward violence after
being exposed to a pedagogic module (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report) with the
aim of reflecting on the history of political violence in Peru and promoting a culture of peace
(Espinosa et al., 2019). The Espinosa and colleagues concluded that exposure to the module was
able to reduce attitudes promoting violence, on average, as compared with a group that was not
exposed to the module. The results of this study suggest that environments that foster peace and
reflection, especially after a time of violence, are better able to diminish endorsements of
violence, on average, as compared with those that do not explicitly promote peace efforts and
reconciliation among communities. Research has not shown, however, how general attitudes
toward violence may be affected by exposure to collective action groups displaying violent and
nonviolent protesting tactics.
Attitudes Toward Protest Group
When considering favorable attitudes toward protest groups, the effect of education on
protesting attitudes has been a crucial factor. Hall and colleagues (1986) posit that while support
diminishes for protests or authorities that use violence, higher levels of education increase public
opposition to government repression of protest groups. Those with higher education have
diminished support for protest causes that seem to be related to issues from less educated groups
as compared to more educated groups (Hall et al., 1986). Additional demographic characteristic
predictors other than education, such as age, race, and occupation also influence attitudes toward
protest groups (Hall et al., 1986).
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Favorable attitudes toward protest groups are also moderated by predictors of empathic
concern and perspective-taking (Wilson & Atouba, 2021). During the height of the 2016 national
anthem protesting by Colin Kaepernick and other professional athletes, public perceptions and
attitudes toward this form of protesting varied. Batson (2011) and Longmire and Harrison
(2018), propose that empathic concern is a display of public regard for the protest cause and
wanting to provide altruistic help, as cited in a study by Wilson and Atouba (2021). Empathic
concern was positively related to favorable attitudes toward groups protesting the national
anthem (Wilson & Atouba, 2021). However, results from this study found that perspectivetaking, or the ability to take on the perspective of another (Park & Raile, 2010), did not relate to
favorable attitudes toward groups protesting the national anthem (Wilson & Atouba, 2021). The
previous research suggests that favorable attitudes toward protest groups is not only related to the
education status of an observer, but also to an emotional connection one has to the protest group
or its cause. This idea of an emotional connection to the protest group cause relates to the
interpersonal nature of political solidarity and the cause commitment factor.
Activist Engagement
Acts of protest amid political tension are unique, in that their inception alone can lead
groups of people to engage in direct action for a common cause. Differences in ideological
thought and values, as well as feelings of grievance, drive people to seek some form of
restorative change, as demonstrated via mobilization of protest and resistance groups (van
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). In an effort to further clarify how perceptions of protest
groups affect activist participation, work by van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) identified
that the determinants of engaging in social action or protest are found in the constructs of
grievances, perceived efficacy of a cause, identity with a cause, evaluation of an emotional
6

connection to a cause, and social embeddedness to networks related to the cause. This is
supported by Sweetman and colleagues’ (2019) assertion that general attiudes toward protesting
predict intentions for individual protesting action.
Furthermore, Hornsey and colleagues’ (2006) research also suggests that the
effectiveness of protest groups and demonstrating their cause are linked to non-protesters’
intentions to engage in activist behaviors (e.g., engaging in general protesting in the next 6
months). Though various studies have investigated the factors that lead people to engage in
activist behavior, there does not seem to be recent research as to how exposure to violence or
nonviolence used by protest groups affects one’s willingness to engage in activism.
Political Alignment
Protesting has become such an integral part of exercising democratic rights in our society,
with several notable protest movements occurring recently. For example, on May 25, 2020,
George Floyd, àṣẹ1, was murdered during police arrest. Just as soon as mention of his death
began circulating, protests ensued. Black Lives Matter (BLM) is a left-leaning, sociopolitical
movement with a mission to “eradicate white supremacy and build local power to intervene in
violence inflicted on Black communities,” (2021). In response to George Floyd’s murder, they
called for action to defund and hold law enforcement accountable for their violent behavior.
Between May 24, 2020, and August 22, 2020, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED) reported that over 10,600 protests were held, with nearly 95% of them
involving peaceful, nonviolent demonstrations (2020). Both political and social discord remain

1

The term àṣẹ, pronounced ah-SHAY, is a West African, Yoruba concept used to honor the legacy of those who

have passed away. Similar to the word, amen, àṣẹ can be used to reflect affirmation of a prayer or wish.
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critical components in understanding why activist and protest phenomena occur, but much is still
to be learned about political affiliation in the context of perceptions of violent and nonviolent
protesting.
Alignment with the mission and philosophy of a group such as Black Lives Matter or any
other social reform movement is an important factor in the discussion that political alignment
may have on the perceptions of violent and nonviolent protest groups, particularly by partisan
groups. Typically, groups such as BLM are recognized as having more liberal ideologies while
groups such as Blue Lives Matter, a countermovement to Black Lives Matter, are known to have
more conservative values. Research has shown that Republicans (a characteristically
conservative group) as opposed to Democrats (a notably liberal group) are more likely to
perceive violence when a group they disapprove of is protesting (Hsiao & Radnitz, 2020).
Further expansion on this topic is needed to understand how partisan affiliation plays a role in
the perception of violent behaviors of collective and social action groups.
The Present Study
The present study explored perceptions of partisan protest groups based on their use of
violent and nonviolent actions and how exposure to these protest groups affects political
solidarity with protesters, attitudes of favorability toward the protesters, attitudes toward
violence, likelihood of future activist behavior, and political alignment with conservative and
liberal ideologies. At this time, research on perceptions of violent and nonviolent protesting
behavior have mainly assessed their effects on identification with protest groups (Simpson et al.,
2018). Studies have also examined the perceived efficacy and legitimacy of use of violence
during protesting (Bäck et al., 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014; Wang & Piazza, 2016). Research
has shown that public opinions, regarding the validity and acceptability of protest groups, vary
8

by protest groups’ use of violence or nonviolence. However, how do more personal attitudes and
opinions about these groups differ based on protest group displays of violence?
Additional research is needed to better understand how exposure to these types of violent
and nonviolent protesting behaviors between conservative and liberal protest groups impact
solidarity with protest members, overall attitudes toward violence and toward the protesters,
willingness to engage in activism, and alignment with conservativism and liberalism. This study
aimed to expand knowledge in this area by exploring how political solidarity, attitudes toward
violence and the protest group, future activist engagement, and political alignment are influenced
by exposure to traditionally conservative and liberal protest groups using violent or nonviolent
strategies.
Hypotheses
The current research had four hypotheses related to the study of conservative and liberal
protest groups’ use of violence and nonviolence during protesting. I first hypothesized a possible
main effect of protest group violence in which mean scores for political solidarity, attitudes
toward a protest group, attitudes toward violence, likelihood of future activism, and political
alignment would be lower for participants exposed to a violent protest group, on average, as
compared to those exposed to a nonviolent protest group. Support for this hypothesis would
confirm previous work, particularly by Simpson and colleagues (2018), regarding use of violence
during protesting as having a negative effect on support for protest groups. Support for this
hypothesis would also offer further evidence as to how more personal attitudes toward protest
groups and individual intentions to engage in activism may be influenced by damaging and
violent protest actions.
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Secondly, I hypothesized that there would be a main effect of protest group political
affiliation in which mean scores for political solidarity, attitudes toward a protest group, attitudes
toward violence, likelihood of future activism, and political alignment would be lower for
participants exposed to a conservative protest group, on average, as compared to those exposed
to a liberal protest group. If this hypothesis were supported, it would provide further evidence
seen in previous research for the effect of political affiliation, particularly by partisan collective
action groups, on perceptions of their behavior (Simpson et al., 2018).
In terms of participants’ political alignment, I hypothesized a potential interaction
between protest group violence and protest group political affiliation. Specifically, I expected
that participants exposed to a violent protest group that had conservative values would espouse
more liberal values, on average, than those exposed to a nonviolent protest group that had
conservative values. In comparison, when the protest group held liberal beliefs, I hypothesized
that participants exposed to a violent protest group would espouse more conservative values, on
average, than those exposed to a nonviolent protest group with liberal values. Additionally, in
terms of likelihood of future activist engagement, I hypothesized a possible interaction between
protest group violence and protest group political affiliation, such that participants exposed to a
liberal protest group would report higher intentionality to participate in future activism, on
average, as compared to participants exposed to a conservative protest group, when the protest
group used nonviolent protesting strategies. In comparison, when participants were exposed to a
conservative protest group, I expected that they would report more intentionality to participate in
activism, on average, as compared to participants who experienced a liberal protest group, when
the protest group used violent protesting strategies.

10

Method
Participants
This study recruited eligible students from Introduction to Psychology courses via Seton
Hall University’s participant recruiting system, SONA Systems, in which all participating
students were at least 18 years of age. Students were asked to voluntarily participate in an
anonymous questionnaire regarding their perceptions about varying groups. Based on their
participation in the study, students received course credit but may have chosen to complete
alternative assignments if they did not wish to participate in research. This study was
preregistered on Open Science Framework.
The software application, G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007), was used for an a priori
analysis to determine the appropriate sample size for this study. G*Power indicated that a total of
128 participants were needed to detect a medium effect size (f = 0.25) to achieve 0.80 power
with a 0.05 alpha level for a two-by-two between-groups ANOVA. The calculated sample size
was the number of participants needed in order to reject the null hypothesis of this study, if
indeed it should be rejected, in 80% of studies like this one.
The study sample consisted of a total of 147 participants with a mean age of 19 (M =
18.71, SD = 1.86). There were 53 first-year students (39%), 62 sophomores (46%), 14 juniors
(10%), and 7 (5%) seniors who participated in the study. There was a total of 94 (70%) female
participants, 40 male participants (30%), and no participants who classified as any other gender
identity. In terms of ethnicity, there were 33 Hispanic/Latino participants (24%) and 103 nonHispanic/Latino participants (76%). The races of the study sample consisted of 86 White (63%),
22 Asian (16%), 10 Black or African American (7%), 6 multiracial (4%), 2 American
Indian/Alaska Native (2%), and 2 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (2%) participants,
11

along with 8 participants who identified as another racial category (6%). Data regarding
participants’ currently held political beliefs were not captured in this study.
Measures
Attitudes Toward Violence Scale (ATVS). The current study first asked participants to
read a Twitter-like post regarding the actions of a violent or nonviolent protest group with liberal
or conservative values. After exposure to one of the protest groups, participants proceeded to
answer questions related to their general attitudes toward violence. The adapted Attitude Toward
Violence Scale (ATVS) is a modified measure by Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1995), based on a 48item scale by Velicer and colleagues (1989) to assess attitudes toward violence. Compared to the
Velicer model, Lonsway and Fitzgerald’s adapted version of the ATVS reflects less violence in
the language used as a means of reducing social desirability in participants’ responses (1995).
The original assessment includes 4 constructs of violence, with 5 questions within each
construct: penal code violence, violence in war, violence against children, and intimate partner
violence. The adapted ATVS utilizes a shorter 20-item scale as a measure of acceptance of
violence, 10 of which measure attitudes toward violence in intimate relationships and 10 of
which measure attitudes toward violence across other constructs. A sum of the response to items
determines the total score of attitudes toward violence, where a higher score on the scale
indicates more accepting attitudes toward violence and a lower score on the scale represents less
accepting attitudes toward violence. In testing scale reliability, Lonsway and Fitzgerald’s ATVS
yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87, an indication of good internal consistency. The current study
yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88.
Because this study did not have a specific focus on interpersonal violence, the ATVS was
further adapted to exclude the 10 items related to intimate partner violence and violence against
12

children. The other 10 items associated with the constructs of penal code violence and violence
in war were used to assess differences in participants’ attitudes and beliefs about violence using a
standard 7-point Likert-style format, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. For
example, the ATVS scale included items such as “violent crimes should be punished violently,”
and “the government should send armed soldiers to control violent university riots.”
Attitudes Toward Protest Group (ATPG). To evaluate attitudes and favorability of the
target protest group, participants were asked to answer an 11-item measure using a 7-point
Likert-style scale between 1 = very untrue and 7 = very true. Sums of scores ranged from 11-77,
where lower sums of scores related to less favorability of a protest group, compared to higher
sums of scores, which indicated more favorability in attitudes toward a protest group. This study
measure yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89.
Political Solidarity Measure (PSM). In order to evaluate participants’ solidarity with a
target protest group, the Political Solidarity Measure (PSM), with a coefficient alpha of 0.92, was
utilized (Neufeld et al., 2019). The present study yielded coefficient alphas of 0.99 and 0.98 for
the liberal and conservative protest groups, respectively. This 30-item measure used a 7-point,
Likert-style rating scale between 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Sums of scores
will range from 30-210, where lower sums of scores are related to less support for and
commitment to a protest group, compared to higher sums of scores, which indicate more support
for and commitment to a protest group. Factors for this assessment included allyship (𝛼=.86), ,
cause connection (𝛼=.88), and social change commitment (𝛼=.88).
Activism Orientation Scale (AOS). The Activism Orientation scale was used to assess
participants’ likelihood of participating in social action in the future (Corning & Myers, 2002).
Initially tested with university students who identified as activists and non-activists, this 35-item
13

scale used a revised 4-point rating scale (1 = extremely unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = likely, and 4 =
extremely likely). Total scores from summation of items range from 35 to 140, where higher
scores indicate increased likelihood of engagement in activism and lower scores indicate
decreased likelihood of engagement in activism. Corning and Myers’ measure and the measure
used in the current study both showed extremely high internal consistency with a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.96.
Political Alignment Scale (PAS). Exploring diversity of political beliefs in the sample
of this study was relevant to understanding perceptions about the protest groups. In order to
explore participants’ level of conservatism versus liberalism, the Political Alignment Scale
(PAS) was incorporated in this study (Cohen et al., 2009). The 11-item measure was found to
have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94, representative of high internal validity. One additional item
was added to the measure “President Biden makes me proud to be an American,” as the original
measure only captured this item from the Republican perspective. In the present study, the PAS
was found to be highly reliable (12 items; α = .93). This measure utilized a rating scale from 1 =
very untrue of me to 7 = very true of me. Sums of scores ranged from 12-84, where a lower sum
of scores indicated a more liberal political alignment as compared to a higher sum of scores,
which indicated more conservative political alignment. The measure included items such as “I
admire President Bush” and “In the last [2004] election, I voted for John Kerry (or would have if
I voted).” The scale was developed during the 2004 United States Presidential election;
therefore, it was revised to reflect current political figures. Revised items included “I admire
President Biden,” and “I admire President Trump,” as well as “In the last [2020] election, I voted
for Joe Biden (or would have if I voted),” and “In the last [2020] election, I voted for Donald
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Trump (or would have if I voted).” Six items related to liberal political ideologies were reverse
scored.
Demographic Questionnaire. Each participant was asked to complete a demographic
questionnaire asking them to report their gender identity, age, year in school, race, ethnicity, and
religion.
Procedure
Participants accessed the link to the online survey via Qualtrics, an online survey
platform, to which they were asked to provide informed consent before proceeding to the study.
Participants were randomly assigned to read a fabricated Twitter-like post about one of two
fictitious protest groups: the Society for Black Liberation and Justice (SBLJ), a liberal-leaning
protest group, or the Society for Law Enforcement (SLE) group, a conservative-leaning protest
group. All vignettes used the same language except for manipulating the violent or nonviolent
behavior of a protest group and whether the violent or nonviolent behavior was being carried out
by a liberal or conservative protest group (e.g., SBLJ or SLE). After reading the vignette,
participants were asked to answer a series of questionnaires regarding attitudes toward violence
and attitudes of favorability toward the protest group. Participants also received questions asking
about political solidarity with the protest group, likelihood of engaging in protest activity in the
future, political alignment with conservative or liberal ideologies, and a set of demographic
questions.
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Results
The aim of this study, using a 2 x 2 factorial design, was to assess how exposure to
violent and nonviolent protest groups with conservative and liberal political affiliations affected
scores on all five measures: participants’ attitudes toward violence, attitudes toward the protest
group, solidarity with the protest group, likelihood of activist engagement in the future, and
political alignment with conservative or liberal values. I conducted a series of two-way
ANOVAs using the independent variables of protest group use of violence (i.e., violent or
nonviolent behavior) and protest group political affiliation (i.e., conservative or liberal groups).
Specifically, a two-way ANOVA was conducted for each of the five dependent variables in order
to test all hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis related to a possible main effect of protest group violence.
Specifically, the first hypothesis stated that participants being exposed to a violent protest group
would lead to lower scores across all five measures: solidarity with the protest group, attitudes of
favorability toward the protest group, attitudes toward violence, likelihood of future activism,
and political alignment, as compared to participants who read about a nonviolent protest group.
With respect to the dependent variable of likelihood of future activist engagement as
measured by the Activism Orientation Scale (AOS), there was a main effect of protest group use
of violence on likelihood of engaging in future activism, such that participants who read about
nonviolent protesting tactics had higher scores, on average, than participants who read about
violent protesting tactics (Figure 1). This was a small effect. There was not a statistically
significant main effect for any of the other four variables. Moreover, there were only small
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effects for these four other variables. See Table 1 for all statistics for hypothesis 1 and Table 2
for means and standard deviations for hypothesis 1.

Figure 1.
Effect of Protest Group Use of Violence on Likelihood of Future Activism

150
100
Activism
Orientation
Score
50
0
Nonviolent
Violent
Protest Group Use of Violence
Note: Error bars represent standard errors.

Table 1.
Main Effect of Protest Group Use of Violence by Study Measure

Political Solidarity Measure
Attitudes Toward Protest Group
Attitudes Toward Violence Scale
Activism Orientation Scale
Political Alignment Scale

Protest Group Use of Violence
F (1,132-133) p
η2 p
.01
.928
< .001
.90
.343
.007
.27
.602
.002
5.38
< .022
.040
1.92
.169
.014
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Table 2.
Means and Standard Deviations of Protest Group Use of Violence by Study Measure
Political
Solidarity
Measure
M
SD
Violent
130.0 47.47
Nonviolent 130.8 41.08
*p < .05

Attitudes
Toward Protest
Group
M
SD
47.8
13.67
49.5
13.82

Attitudes
Toward
Violence Scale
M
SD
34.2
11.22
35.2
11.92

Activism
Orientation
Scale
M
SD
64.6* 18.86
72.5* 20.16

Political
Alignment
Scale
M
SD
47.4
21.17
52.4
21.19

Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis related to a possible main effect of protest group political
affiliation. Specifically, the second hypothesis stated that participants reading about a
conservative protest group would lead to lower scores across all measures: solidarity with the
protest group, attitudes toward the protest group, attitudes toward violence, likelihood of future
activism, and participant political alignment with conservativism or liberalism, as compared to
participants who read about liberal protesters.
With respect to the dependent variable of favorable attitudes toward the protest group,
there was a statistically significant main effect of protest group political affiliation with a large
effect, such that participants who read about liberal protest groups had higher mean scores than
those who read about conservative protest groups (Figure 2).
There was also a main effect of protest group political affiliation on participant solidarity
with the protest group with a large effect size, such that participants who read about liberal
protest groups had a higher mean score than those who read about conservative protest groups
(Figure 3). There was not a statistically significant main effect of protest group political
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affiliation on the other three variables. See Table 3 for all statistics for hypothesis 2 and Table 4
for means and standard deviations for hypothesis 2.

Figure 2.
Effect of Protest Group Political Affiliation on Attitudes Toward the Protest Group
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Note: Error bars represent standard errors.

Figure 3.
Effect of Protest Group Political Affiliation on Political Solidarity with the Protest Group
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Note: Error bars represent standard errors.
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Table 3.
Main Effect of Protest Group Political Affiliation by Study Measure
Protest Group Political Affiliation
F (1,132-133)
p
28.47
< .001
30.50
< .001
1.29
.259
1.35
.248
.53
.467

Political Solidarity Measure
Attitudes Toward Protest Group
Attitudes Toward Violence Scale
Activism Orientation Scale
Political Alignment Scale

η2 p
.18
.19
.010
.010
.004

Table 4.
Means and Standard Deviations of Protest Group Political Affiliation by Study Measure
Political
Solidarity
Measure
Conservative
Liberal
*p < .001

M
112.5*
149.7*

SD
42.54
37.91

Attitudes
Toward
Violence
Scale
SD
M
SD
13.50 33.6 12.69
11.19 35.8 10.18

Attitudes
Toward
Protest Group

Activism
Orientation
Scale

M
43.0*
54.8*

M
70.7
66.5

Political
Alignment
Scale

SD
M
18.97 48.8
20.72 51.3

SD
21.60
20.96

During data analysis, an issue was identified in the SLE subgroup (conservative protest
group) in which the item was mislabeled as the SBLJ subgroup (liberal protest group). Meaning,
the item from the PSM “I would say I am loyal to the Society for Black Liberation and Justice”
was seen by participants randomly assigned to the SLE subgroup. To address this during the data
analysis phase, the incorrect data for this item was not used and instead was replaced by mean
scores across the 28 other items for the PSM measure of the SLE subgroup. Total scores for the
PSM thus included the original scores from the SBLJ subgroup (which did not have any data
issues) as well as the SLE subgroup’s scores from the 28 non-issue items and set of mean scores
used to replace the one item.
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Hypothesis 3
An additional hypothesis was related to a possible interaction between the two
independent variables. The third hypothesis stated that an interaction existed between protest
group use of violence and protest group political affiliation for participant political alignment
with conservative and liberal values. Specifically, I hypothesized that participants exposed to a
violent, conservative protest group would espouse more liberal values, on average, than those
exposed to a nonviolent, conservative protest group. In comparison, I hypothesized that when
presented a violent, liberal protest group, participants would espouse more conservative values,
on average, than those exposed to a nonviolent protest group with liberal values. This interaction
on political alignment with conservativism and liberalism was not statistically significant. See
Table 5 for statistics and Table 6 for means and standard deviations for hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4
There was one other hypothesis related to a possible interaction between the two
independent variables. Specifically, the fourth hypothesis stated that there would be an
interaction between protest group violence and protest group political affiliation such that when
presented a protest group using nonviolent strategies, participants exposed to a liberal protest
group would report higher intentionality to participate in future activism, on average, as
compared to participants exposed to a conservative, nonviolent protest group. Comparatively,
when participants were exposed to a conservative, violent protest group, I hypothesized that they
would report more intentionality to participate in activism, on average, as compared to
participants who experienced a liberal protest group using violent protesting strategies. This
interaction on the likelihood of participant future activism was not found to be statistically
significant. See Table 5 for statistics and Table 6 means and standard deviations for hypothesis 4.
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Although not hypothesized, interactions between protest group use of violence and
political affiliation on attitudes toward violence, attitudes of favorability toward the protest
group, and political solidarity with the protest group were not statistically significant either.

Table 5.
Interaction Statistics by Study Measure
Protest Group Political Affiliation X Protest
Group Use of Violence
F (1,132-133)
p
η2 p
.21
.650
.002
.01
.936
.001
.05
.827
.001
1.37
.244
.010
.04
.836
.001

Political Solidarity Measure
Attitudes Toward Protest Group
Attitudes Toward Violence Scale
Activism Orientation Scale
Political Alignment Scale
Table 6.

Means and Standard Deviations of Protest Group Political Affiliation and Use of Violence by
Study Measure
Protest
Group
Political
Affiliation

Protest
Group Use
of
Violence

Political
Solidarity
Measure

M
Conservative Violent
113.9
Nonviolent 111.3
Total
112.5**
Liberal
Violent
147.8
Nonviolent 151.6
Total
149.7**
Total
Violent
64.6*
Nonviolent 72.5*
Total
68.7
*p < .05 **p < .001

SD
40.2
45.0
42.5
34.9
41.2
37.9
18.9
20.2
19.9

Attitudes
Toward
Protest
Group
M
SD
42.0
14.3
43.9
12.9
43.0** 13.5
53.7
10.2
55.9
12.2
54.8** 11.2
47.8
13.7
49.5
13.8
48.7
13.7
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Attitudes
Toward
Violence
Scale
M
SD
32.8 12.3
34.3 13.1
33.6 12.7
35.5 10.0
36.1 10.5
35.8 10.2
34.2 11.2
35.2 11.9
34.7 11.6

Activism
Political
Orientation Alignment
Scale
Scale
M
64.6
76.2
70.7
64.9
68.4
66.5
64.6
72.5
68.7

SD
17.7
18.6
19.0
20.3
21.3
20.7
18.9
20.2
19.9

M
45.7
51.5
48.8
49.1
53.4
51.3
47.4
52.4
50.0

SD
21.8
21.3
21.6
20.7
21.3
21.0
21.2
21.2
21.2

Discussion
Currently, there is substantial research regarding public perceptions of legitimacy,
support, reasonableness, and identification with violent protest groups. To my knowledge, there
has not yet been research conducted on perceptions of conservative and liberal protest groups’
varied use of violence on public solidarity with a protest group, ratings of favorability attitudes
toward a protest group, general attitudes toward violence, likelihood of engaging as an activist,
and political alignment with conservative or liberal values. The present study aimed to assess
perceptions of protest groups with various attributes (i.e., conservative or liberal political
affiliation and use of violent or nonviolent protesting tactics). In addition, the study was
conducted to understand how perceptions of these types of protest groups vary as they relate to
attitudes toward violence, favorable attitudes toward protest groups, solidarity with a protest
group, intentions for future activist behavior, and political alignment with conservative and
liberal ideologies.
Protest Group Degree of Violence
Study results did not support the hypothesis that exposure to a violent protest group
would lower scores across measures for solidarity with the protest group, attitudes toward the
protest group, attitudes toward violence, and partisan political alignment, on average, as
compared to a nonviolent protest group. However, this hypothesis was supported for likelihood
of future activism as measured by Corning and Myers’ (2002) Activism Orientation Scale (AOS)
which assessed participants’ likelihood of future activist behavior. These results highlight the
impact that exposure to violent protesting may have on a commitment and plan to participating
in activism. In those exposed to protest group violence, a hesitation to participate in activism
oneself may develop. A natural reaction to avoid danger may be triggered by viewing violence in
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protesting, especially by protest observers whose cause one may or may not identify with. A lack
of significant results for the other measures may be explained by the already strongly held
attitudes participants have toward conservativism and liberalism; thus, there is unwavering
solidarity, attitudes, and political alignment for these protest groups. Attitudes toward violence
also may be relatively stable opinions, unlikely to be changed simply by reading about protesting
violence.
Protest Group Political Affiliation
Unexpectedly for the second hypothesis of this study, the effect of protest group
conservative and liberal political affiliation on attitudes toward violence, likelihood of future
activism, and political alignment with the protest group were not supported. However, there were
statistically significant differences in scores for conservative and liberal protest groups, on
average, in assessing solidarity with the protest group and favorable attitudes toward the protest
group.
Specifically, the study found that participants who read about a liberal protest group were
more likely to hold political solidarity with that group, on average, as compared to others who
read about a conservative protest group. These results captured Neufeld and colleagues’ (2019)
factors of allyship, connection to the cause, and social change commitment as discussed in their
study on support and solidarity with protest groups. Perhaps participant support for and solidarity
with more liberal groups is due to the study being conducted on a Northeastern United States
college campus in a traditionally Democratic state. Additionally, study results also indicated that
participants who were exposed to a liberal protest group held more favorable attitudes toward the
group, on average, as compared to those who were exposed to a conservative protest group.
Again, given the regional context of where this study was conducted, these results are logical.
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Ultimately, this study’s results highlight the polarization between conservative and liberal
political value systems in assessing protest groups and its implications for how collective action
groups may be perceived based on their political affiliation.
Interaction Between Protest Group Political Affiliation and Use of Violence
This study sought to explore the interaction between protest group violence and protest
group political affiliation on alignment with conservative and liberal political values. I
hypothesized that participants exposed to violent, conservative protest groups would espouse
more liberal values, on average, than those exposed to a nonviolent, conservative protest group.
In comparison, I hypothesized that when presented a violent, liberal protest group, participants
would espouse more conservative values, on average, than those exposed to a nonviolent protest
group with liberal beliefs. This hypothesis was not supported by the results as the interaction
between group violence and protest group affiliation were not statistically significant. This,
again, may be due to participants’ long-held political values being sustained throughout the
duration of this study; thus, their political leaning toward conservativism or liberalism was not
affected.
The last hypothesis explored in this study was the interaction between protest group
violence and protest group political affiliation on likelihood of future activist behavior. It was
expected that when presented a liberal protest group using nonviolent strategies, participants
would report higher intentionality to participate in activism, on average, as compared to
participants exposed to a conservative, nonviolent protest group. In comparison, when
participants were exposed to a conservative, violent protest group, I hypothesized that they
would report more intentionality to participate in activism, on average, as compared to
participants who experienced a liberal protest group using violent protesting strategies. Results
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for this hypothesis were not statistically significant. A possible rationale for this occurrence may
be explained by general attitudes toward protesting now having a more negative connotation
given the current scope of protesting attitudes among liberal and conservative groups. Specific
language concerning participation in rioting or an insurrection are viewed with politicallycharged sentiments. Not wanting negative feedback about one’s involvement in these types of
demonstrations may have an influence on intentions to engage in activism when comparing the
protest groups’ political affiliation as well as their use of protest violence.
This study’s results add to the current literature on experiences of support for and
commitment to protest groups based on their political affiliation and use of violence. Although
results for this study may not have been entirely as expected, much can still be explored and
adapted for future research.
Strengths and Limitations
In conducting this study, it is clear that there were some limitations to this work. Because
the current study was conducted on one Northeastern United States college campus, it was not
representative of a more general population, making it low in external validity. This study was
limited to a fairly homogenous college population. The campus, as was reflected in the
participant pool, is made largely of young college students (i.e., late adolescent age and young
adult age) who are White and generally of the same liberal political affiliation. It is not clear as
to the way in which other demographic groups may perceive the study protest groups and their
use of violence. Cultural differences among immigrant groups in America or even different
regions of the United States may have implications for how protest groups and their use of
protesting violence are perceived.
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Another limitation of the study is that the Twitter-like vignettes were created as a more
modern approach to displaying news-worthy information rather than creating a fictious news
article for participants to read, as was done in Simpson and colleague’s (2018) research on use of
violence among various protest groups. I tried to adhere to the Twitter 280-character limit for
each of the study vignettes. While this innovative approach seemed fitting for the college-age
students who frequent social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, and Tik Tok, the level
of detail about the protesting groups and their behavior in the vignettes was minimal. This may
have limited participants’ ability to make strong enough perceptions about the fictious protest
groups they read about.
Per the literature on protest group perceptions, a notable strength of the study was that it
was one of only a few experimental studies looking at a number of perceptions related to support
and attitudes toward the protest groups using violent and nonviolent protesting behaviors. One
final strength of this work was the time of which it was conducted. After the election of President
Joe Biden in 2020, along with the tumultuous events of the January 6, 2021 protest at the United
States Capitol building, the unfortunate political unrest in the country has been at the forefront of
American politics. Especially given the ongoing investigations into the events of the 2021 protest
at the Capitol and continued protest against unjust treatment and killing of Black Americans,
there are an array of conservative and liberal issues leading to an increase in strained and divisive
partisan relations. This work was able to capture perceptions of partisan protest groups and their
use of violent and nonviolent behavior at a time in which the country has a number of constant
and unresolved political problems. These issues may continue for some time, so future studies
may also be able to capture perceptions of various protest groups while U.S. partisan relations
are so fragile.
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Future Directions
Future studies may benefit from researching a variety of protest groups’ use of violent
and nonviolent strategies as they relate to perceptions of these groups. For example, further
exploration of attitudes toward protest groups and solidarity with these groups may offer muchneeded insight on other collective action movements aside from politically liberal and
conservative pairs (e.g., environmentalists, immigration groups, and other social reform groups).
Participant demographic characteristics related to race and ethnic background, gender identity,
sexual orientation, and age may also play a role in how protest groups are perceived; thus,
providing further information as to how personal identity may have implications for support and
favorability of various types of protest groups.
Work by Awad and Wagner (2020) theorized the functioning of protest symbols, such as
online media hashtags (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter), as a sort of cause identity marker. Awad and
Wagner (2020) discussed that protest symbols are used to forward the cause of collective action
groups and are significant as representations of these movements. They theorized that protest
symbols may function in two ways: as triggers to motivate protest action and as collective
symbolism of group identity and solidarity (Awad & Wagner, 2020). The current study had a
primary focus in understanding perceptions of protest groups including looking at public
attitudes of solidarity toward a protest group. Perhaps future work may be better able to
understand the influence of protest group political affiliation and use of protest violence on
perceptions of protest groups by incorporating protest symbols or identity markers for a cause
into study vignettes. Protesting symbols connection to political solidarity may affect the strength
of public solidarity and connectedness to a protest group as they vary by political affiliation and
their use of protesting violence.
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Conclusion
Although the findings of this study are important in understanding how perceptions of
protest groups may or may not be influenced by group political affiliation and use of protest
violence, much is still to be studied on this topic. Continued work on perceptions of protest
groups may help to inform research in social psychology. Related to the theory of support for
protesting previously discussed, to understand the influences on public support for protesting we
must understand that support from those who are not involved in a protest group (i.e., the public)
have the ability to contribute to the success of that protest group’s cause (Turner, 1969;
Rodeghier et al., 1991). Support from outsiders is a key factor in perceived protest legitimacy
and attitudes toward a protest group. Thus, protest groups must find methods not only to voice
the concerns of their cause but also to procure support from the public in their quest for equality,
which may be influenced by use of violence. In summary, with continued research on
perceptions of protest groups, the influence of factors on public attitudes toward protesters and
the ability to connect with and support these movements and social reform groups can be further
understood.
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Appendix A
Informed Consent
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Appendix B
Vignettes
The vignettes are set up as a 2 x 2:
• Protest group behavior: violent (orange text), nonviolent (green text)
• Protest group political affiliation: conservative (red text), liberal (blue text)
Vignette Scenarios:
1. violent liberal protest group
2. nonviolent liberal protest group
3. violent conservative protest group
4. nonviolent conservative protest group
Violent Liberal Protest Group Condition
Tweet: Early Saturday morning, a group of approximately 150 Society for Black Liberation and
Justice (SBLJ) protesters gathered in a local park. There are multiple reports that the SBLJ
protesters engaged in violent actions by rioting and looting local businesses.
Nonviolent Liberal Protest Group Condition
Tweet: Early Saturday morning, a group of approximately 150 Society for Black Liberation and
Justice (SBLJ) protesters gathered in a local park. There are multiple reports that the SBLJ
protesters held a nonviolent protest by engaging in a peaceful march followed by a sit-in in the
park.
Violent Conservative Protest Group Condition
Tweet: Early Saturday morning, a group of approximately 150 Society for Law Enforcement
(SLE) protesters gathered in a local park. There are multiple reports that the SLE protesters
engaged in violent actions by rioting and looting local businesses.
Nonviolent Conservative Protest Group Condition
Tweet: Early Saturday morning, a group of approximately 150 Society for Law Enforcement
(SLE) protesters gathered in a local park. There are multiple reports that the SLE protesters held
a nonviolent protest by engaging in a peaceful march followed by a sit-in in the park.
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Appendix C
Measures
Political Solidarity Measure (PSM) (Neufeld et al., 2019)
Participants were asked to answer the following 30-item measure using a 7-point Likert-style
scale between 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Sums of scores ranged from 30-210,
where lower sums of scores is related to less support for and commitment to a protest group,
compared to higher sums of scores, which indicate more support for and commitment to a protest
group. Blue text in the revised measure is indicative of the liberal protest group, the Society for
Black Liberation and Justice and red text is indicative of the conservative protest group, the
Society for Law Enforcement. Depending on what protest group a participant is randomly
assigned to, either the blue or red text in brackets was used.
Original Measure:
In this section, you will answer a series of questions about your feelings toward another group
and a current issue related to the group, that is, their “cause.” It is ok if you do not agree with the
group or the cause.
The group you will reflect on is [outgroup]. The cause you will reflect on is [issue].
[Outgroup issue description; see “Issue Descriptions” below]
Using the scale below, please answer the following questions. Remember to answer the
questions while thinking about [outgroup] and their cause, [issue].
1. I feel a sense of “brotherhood” or “sisterhood” with _____.
2. _____can count on me to be their ally.
3. _____ and I are “all in this together”.
4. I stand in solidarity with _____.
5. I feel a sense of solidarity with _____ .
6. It’s important for me to stick together with _______.
7. I stand united with _____.
8. In some ways, I have a sense of responsibility toward _____.
9. I would say I am loyal to _____.
10. I feel committed to _____.
11. In some ways, I view _____’s cause as my cause, too.
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12. _____’s cause is important to me.
13. I identify with _____’s cause.
14. I think _____’s cause is worthy.
15. I share _____’s goal.
16. I feel partly responsible to ensure that _____’s interests are met.
17. Working together to achieve ______’s goal is important to me.
18. I have a role to play in _____’s cause.
19. I am committed to supporting _____’s cause.
20. I feel connected to _____’s cause.
21. Policies negatively affecting ______ should be changed.
22. All citizens should be better informed about how ______are disadvantaged by policies.
23. More people should know about how _______ are negatively affected by this issue.
24. It’s important to challenge the power structures that disadvantage ______.
25. Power structures that disadvantage ______are unfair.
26. Policies and laws that are unfair to ______must be changed.
27. The way that the authorities treat ______is unjust.
28. We need policies that will grant equal rights to ______.
29. I believe social systems should change so they guarantee equality for ______.
30. Fighting for social justice for ______means fighting for the social good.
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Issue Descriptions
Indigenous people: Inquiry into missing and murdered Indigenous women
Indigenous women and girls in Canada are disproportionately affected by all forms of violence.
Even though they only make up 4% of Canada’s female population, 16% of all women murdered
in Canada between 1980 and 2012 were Indigenous. Many Indigenous people for more action on
the issue of missing and murdered Indigenous women.
Indigenous people: Reconciliation
For over 100 years, Indigenous children were removed from their families and sent to institutions
called Residential Schools. Students often experienced trauma, which has been passed down
from generation to generation and affected the relationship between Indigenous peoples and
other Canadians. Many Indigenous Peoples are calling for reconciliation to revitalize the
relationship between Indigenous people and other Canadians.
Syrian refugees: Immigration to Canada
The ongoing conflict in Syria has triggered the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today. Half
the country’s pre-war population—more than 11 million people— have been killed or forced to
flee their homes. Many of these Syrian refugees wish to immigrate to Canada.
Transgendered people: Transgender rights
Transgendered people in Canada are disproportionately affected by violence and discrimination.
For example, whereas 20% of straight children feel safe at school, 95% of transgendered students
feel unsafe at school. Many transgendered people are calling for federal laws to provide
transgendered individuals with the same legal protections as other vulnerable groups in Canada.
Black people: Black Lives Matter Canada
Black people in Canada are disproportionately affected by violence and discrimination. For
example, even though they only represent 2.5% of the population, Black people were victims of
42% of reported hate crimes in Canada. Many Black Canadians have joined Black Lives Matter
Canada, a movement that aims to end violence and discrimination against Black Canadians.
Women: Income equality
Women in Canada earn less money than men. In fact, Canadian women earn 20% less than men
even when they do the same job. Many women are calling for policy changes to guarantee
income equality for women.
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Revised Measure for Study:
Issue Descriptions
Society for Black Liberation and Justice
Black people in the United States believe they are disproportionately affected by harassment,
discrimination, and hate crimes. Many people have joined the Society for Black Liberation and
Justice, a movement that aims to end discrimination and injustice against Black people. This
group regularly holds open forums for public discussion, organizes sit-ins, and engages in
protests.
Society for Law Enforcement
Law enforcement in the United States believe they are disproportionately affected by
harassment, discrimination, and hate crimes. Many people have joined the Society for Law
Enforcement, a movement that aims to end discrimination and injustice against law enforcement.
This group regularly holds open forums for public discussion, organizes sit-ins, and engages in
protests.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In this section, you will answer a series of questions about your feelings toward the [Society for
Black Liberation and Justice/Society for Law Enforcement] and a current issue related to the
group, that is, their “cause.” It is ok if you do not agree with the group or the cause.
The group you will reflect on is the [Society for Black Liberation and Justice/Society for Law
Enforcement]. The cause you will reflect on is ending injustice against the [Society for Black
Liberation and Justice/Society for Law Enforcement].
[Society for Black Liberation and Justice issue description/Society for Law Enforcement issue
description]
Using the scale below, please answer the following questions. Remember to answer the
questions while thinking about the [Society for Black Liberation and Justice/Society for Law
Enforcement] and their cause, ending injustice against their group.
1. I feel a sense of “brotherhood” or “sisterhood” with _____.
2. _____can count on me to be their ally.
3. _____ and I are “all in this together”.
4. I stand in solidarity with _____.
5. I feel a sense of solidarity with _____.
6. It’s important for me to stick together with _______.
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7. I stand united with _____.
8. In some ways, I have a sense of responsibility toward _____.
9. I would say I am loyal to _____.
10. I feel committed to _____.
11. In some ways, I view _____’s cause as my cause, too.
12. _____’s cause is important to me.
13. I identify with _____’s cause.
14. I think _____’s cause is worthy.
15. I share _____’s goal.
16. I feel partly responsible to ensure that _____’s interests are met.
17. Working together to achieve ______’s goal is important to me.
18. I have a role to play in _____’s cause.
19. I am committed to supporting _____’s cause.
20. I feel connected to _____’s cause.
21. Policies negatively affecting ______ should be changed.
22. All citizens should be better informed about how ______are disadvantaged by policies.
23. More people should know about how _______ are negatively affected by this issue.
24. It’s important to challenge the power structures that disadvantage ______.
25. Power structures that disadvantage ______are unfair.
26. Policies and laws that are unfair to ______must be changed.
27. We need policies that will grant equal rights to ______.
28. I believe social systems should change so they guarantee equality for ______.
29. Fighting for social justice for ______means fighting for the social good.
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Attitudes Toward Protest Group
Participants were asked to answer the following 11-item measure using a 7-point Likert-style
scale between 1 = very untrue and 7 = very true. Sums of scores ranged from 11-77, where lower
sums of scores is related to less favorability of a protest group, compared to higher sums of
scores, which indicate more favorability of a protest group.
Indicate how true you believe each of the following statements to be.
1. The goals of this group are acceptable to me.
2. This group reflects my values and/or priorities.
3. The actions of this group are appropriate.
4. The beliefs of this group align with my beliefs.
5. I oppose this group.
6. This group is important.
7. I am likely to join this group.
8. I agree with the goals of this group.
9. It is important that this group achieves its goals.
10. The methods used by this group are desirable.
11. The issues this group faces are problematic.

43

Attitudes Toward Violence Scale (ATVS) (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995)
Participants were asked to answer the 10 items from the following 20-item measure (i.e., the
revised assessment for study) using a standard 7-point Likert-style rating scale between 1 =
strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. The sum of scores ranged from 20-140 where lower
summed scores indicate less favorable views of violence, while higher summed scores signify
more favorable views of violence. The original assessment includes 4 constructs of violence,
with 5 questions within each construct: penal code violence, violence in war, violence against
children, and intimate partner violence. Because this study does not have a particular focus on
interpersonal violence, the violence against children and intimate partner violence constructs
have been excluded and only the penal code violence and violence in war construct question
were utilized.
Original Measure:
1. Violent crimes should be punished violently.
2. The death penalty should be part of every penal code.
3. Any prisoner deserves to be mistreated by other prisoners in jail.
4. Any nation should be ready with a strong military at all times.
5. The manufacture of weapons is necessary.
6. War is often necessary.
7. The government should send armed soldiers to control violent university riots.
8. Our country should be aggressive with its military internationally.
9. Killing of civilians should be accepted as an unavoidable part of war.
10. Our country has the right to protect its borders forcefully.
11. A child's habitual disobedience should be punished physically.
12. Giving mischievous children a quick slap is the best way to quickly end trouble.
13. Children should be spanked for temper tantrums.
14. Punishing children physically when they deserve it will make them responsible and mature adults.
15. Young children who refuse to obey should be whipped.
16. It is all right for a partner to hit the other if they are unfaithful.
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17. It is all right for a partner to slap the other if insulted or ridiculed.
18. It is all right for a partner to slap the other's face if challenged.
19. An adult should whip a child for breaking the law.
20. It is all right for a partner to hit the other if they flirt with others.

Revised Measure for Study:
1. Violent crimes should be punished violently.
2. The death penalty should be part of every penal code.
3. Any prisoner deserves to be mistreated by other prisoners in jail.
4. Any nation should be ready with a strong military at all times.
5. The manufacture of weapons is necessary.
6. War is often necessary.
7. The government should send armed soldiers to control violent university riots.
8. Our country should be aggressive with its military internationally.
9. Killing of civilians should be accepted as an unavoidable part of war.
10. Our country has the right to protect its borders forcefully.
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Activism Orientation Scale (AOS) (Corning & Myers, 2002)
Participants were asked to answer the following 35-item measure using an adjusted 4-point
Likert-style scale between 1 = extremely unlikely and 4 = extremely likely. Sum of scores ranged
from 35-140, where a lower sum of scores is related to a decreased likelihood of engagement in
activism in the future, compared to higher sum of scores on the question items, which indicates
an increased likelihood of engaging in activism in the future.
How likely is it that you will engage in this activity in the future?
1. Display a poster or bumper sticker with a political message?
2. Invite a friend to attend a meeting of a political organization or event?
3. Purchase a poster, t-shirt, etc. that endorses a political point of view?
4. Serve as an officer in a political organization?
5. Engage in a political activity in which you knew you will be arrested?
6. Attend an informational meeting of a political group?
7. Organize a political event (e.g., talk, support group, march)?
8. Give a lecture or talk about a social or political issue?
9. Go out of your way to collect information on a social or political issue?
10. Campaign door-to-door for a political candidate?
11. Present facts to contest another person’s social or political statement?
12. Donate money to a political candidate?
13. Vote in a non-presidential federal, state, or local election?
14. Engage in a physical confrontation at a political rally?
15. Send a letter or e-mail expressing a political opinion to the editor of a periodical or television
show?
16. Engage in a political activity in which you feared that some of your possessions would be
damaged?
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17. Engage in an illegal act as part of a political protest?
18. Confront jokes, statements, or innuendoes that opposed a particular group’s cause?
19. Boycott a product for political reasons?
20. Distribute information representing a particular social or political group’s cause?
21. Engage in a political activity in which you suspect there would be a confrontation with the
police or possible arrest?
22. Send a letter or email about a political issue to a public official?
23. Attend a talk on a particular group’s social or political concerns?
24. Attend a political organization's regular planning meeting?
25. Sign a petition for a political cause?
26. Encourage a friend to join a political organization?
27. Try to change a friend's or acquaintance's mind about a social or political issue?
28. Block access to a building or public area with your body?
29. Donate money to a political organization?
30. Try to change a relative's mind about a social or political issue?
31. Wear a t-shirt or button with a political message?
32. Keep track of the views of members of Congress regarding an issue important to you?
33. Participate in discussion groups designed to discuss issues or solutions of a particular social
or political group?
34. Campaign by phone for a political candidate?
35. Engage in any political activity in which you fear for your personal safety?
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Political Alignment Scale (PAS) (Cohen et al., 2009)
Participants were asked to answer the following revised 12-item measure using a standard 7point Likert-style scale between 1 = very untrue of me and 7 = very true of me. Sum of scores
ranged from 12-84, where a lower sum of scores is related to more liberal values, whereas a
higher sum of scores on the question items indicates more conservative values. The revised
measure for this study replaces language about past political figures with language to reflect
more current political figures.
Original Measure:
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point
scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely
liberal to extremely conservative.
1. In terms of my political identity, I consider myself to be conservative.
2. I have positive feelings about the Republican Party.
3. In terms of my political identity, I consider myself to be liberal. (reverse-scored)
4. I have positive feelings about the Democratic Party. (reverse-scored)
5. I admire President Bush.
6. President Bush makes me proud to be an American.
7. I admire Hillary Rodham Clinton. (reverse-scored)
8. In the last [2004] election, I voted for President Bush (or would have if I voted).
9. In the last [2004] election, I voted for John Kerry (or would have if I voted). (reverse-scored)
10. I feel that the US is now on the right track.
11. I feel that the US is now on the wrong track. (reverse-scored).
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Revised Measure for Study:
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Indicate how true you
believe each of the following statements to be about you.
1. In terms of my political identity, I consider myself to be conservative.
2. I have positive feelings about the Republican Party.
3. In terms of my political identity, I consider myself to be liberal. (reverse-scored)
4. I have positive feelings about the Democratic Party. (reverse-scored)
5. I admire President Trump.
6. President Trump makes me proud to be an American.
7. I admire President Biden. (reverse-scored)
8. President Biden makes me proud to be an American. (reverse-scored)
9. In the last [2020] election, I voted for President Trump (or would have if I voted).
10. In the last [2020] election, I voted for President Biden (or would have if I voted). (reversescored)
11. I feel that the US is now on the right track. (reverse-scored)
12. I feel that the US is now on the wrong track.
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Demographic Questionnaire
1. What year are you at Seton Hall?
a. First year student
b. Sophomore
c. Junior
d. Senior
2. What is your gender?
a. Female
b. Male
c. Other, please specify:
3. What is your age?
4. What is your ethnicity?
a. Hispanic/Latino
b. Non-Hispanic/Non-Latino
5. What is your race?
a. American Indian/Alaskan Native
b. Asian
c. Black or African American
d. Caucasian/White
e. Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
f. Multiracial, please specify:
g. Other, please specify:
6. What is your religion?
a. Christianity/Catholicism
b. Judaism
c. Islam
d. Hinduism
e. Buddhism
f. Other, please specify:
g. No religious affiliation
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Appendix D
Debriefing Form

Thank you for participating in today’s study! We appreciate your time and effort. We would like
to share more information with you regarding the details of this study.

This study’s purpose is to investigate how perceptions of protest group violence and protest
group political beliefs affect participants’ political solidarity with a protest group, their attitudes
toward a protest group, their attitudes toward violence, engagement in future activism, and their
political ideology. This study uses fictitious Tweets to manipulate conditions of protesting
violence (violent or nonviolent protest groups) and political beliefs of a protest group
(conservative or liberal protest groups).

If you are struggling with mental health concerns or dealing with violence and would like to talk
to someone, please contact the Seton Hall University’s Counseling and Psychological Services
(CAPS) Office in Mooney Hall at (973) 761-9500.

Please do not discuss your experience in this study with anybody who may possibly participate
in this study in the future (including your classmates) so that all individuals who enter the study
are unbiased and respond to our study as truthfully as possible. If you have any questions, please
feel free to ask Tahra Anglade at tahra.anglade@shu.edu or Dr. Susan Nolan at
susan.nolan@shu.edu. Thank you again for your time and participation!
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Appendix E
IRB Approval

10/11/2021
Tahra Anglade
Seton Hall University
Re: 2022-258
Dear Tahra,
The Research Ethics Committee of the Seton Hall University Institutional Review Board reviewed and
approved the amendment to your research proposal entitled, “Perceptions of Protest Groups” as
submitted. This memo serves as official notice of the aforementioned study’s approval.
Approval of this amendment does not change the previous expiration date from your one-year approval
period. You will receive a communication from the Institutional Review Board at least 1 month prior to
the original expiration date requesting that you submit an Annual Progress Report to keep the study
active, or a Final Review of Human Subjects Research to close the study.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Office of the Institutional Review Board
Presidents Hall · 400 South Orange Avenue · South Orange, New Jersey 07079 · Tel: 973.275.4654 · Fax 973.275.2978 ·
www.shu.edu
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